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Abstract
Roll call data are widely used to assess legislators’ preferences and ideology, as well as
test theories of legislative behavior. In particular, roll call data is often used to determine
whether the revealed preferences of legislators are affected by outside forces such as party
pressure, minority status or procedural rules. This paper describes a Bayesian hierarchical
model that extends existing spatial voting models to test sharp hypotheses about differences
in preferences the using posterior probabilities associated with such hypotheses. We use our
model to investigate the effect of the change of party majority status during the 107th U.S.
Senate on the revealed preferences of senators. This analysis provides evidence that change in
party affiliation might affect the revealed preferences of legislators, but provides no evidence
about the effect of majority status on the revealed preferences of legislators.
Keywords: Spatial Voting Model; Hypothesis Testing; Spike-and-Slab Prior; Revealed
Preferences; Factor Analysis.
1 Introduction
Spatial voting models (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Jackman, 2001;
Clinton et al., 2004) are widely used to infer preferences of members of legislative and judicial
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bodies from their voting records. Put simply, such models posit that legislators have a most pre-
ferred policy – their ideal point –, which can be represented as a point in some Euclidean space,
and vote for/against motions in accordance with their (latent) preferences. Hence, by estimating
the ideal point of a legislator from their observed voting behavior we can recover a legislator’s
revealed preference (eg. Varian, 2006; Richter, 1966). In turn, revealed preferences are often used
to construct ideological scales from voting records. Indeed, while ideology has a long a varied
history of usage in scholarship, (see eg, Knight 1985), political ideology usually refers to specific
policy views and preferences held by individuals. Although political ideology may be based on
“an underlying philosophy on which all specific political views are based” (pg 17, Jessee, 2012),
or stem from logical and psycological sets of constraints influencing a person’s beliefs (Converse,
1964), the notion is often operationalized in terms of revealed preferences and ideal points (e.g.,
Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
Political scientist often assume that legislators preferences remain stable, at least over short
periods of time, (e.g., see Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004, Shor et al., 2010 and Shor and McCarty,
2011). However, although this assumption has some empirical support, the evidence is equivocal.
For example, although Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find that members of congress tend to express
very stable policy positions across their careers, Nokken (2000) and Nokken and Poole (2004) find
evidence that legislators who switch party affiliations while serving in Congress exhibit changes
in revealed policy preferences, and Jenkins (2000) and Snyder Jr. and Groseclose (2000) argue
that revealed policy preferences shift across institutional settings and can be influenced by party
pressure. Similarly, Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) find evidence that legislators exhibit changes
in revealed policy preferences after they have been defeated in a primary or have decided to retire,
while Carson et al. (2004) make the opposite argument using the same data but a slightly different
statistical model. As a final example, May (1973) and Clausen and Wilcox (1987) argue that the
minority status of a party might affect the revealed preferences of its legislators. The argument is
based on simple game-theoretic models that show the minority party may be able to secure policies
closer to their ideal point by staking out extreme positions (Merrill et al., 1999).
The voting record of the 107th U.S. Senate is a particularly interesting dataset to investigate
questions about the stability of legislators’ revealed preferences. This is because during the 107th
U.S. Senate, which met between January 3rd, 2001 and December 31st, 2002, control of the U.S.
Senate formally shifted within the course of the two-year congressional term. The 2000 congres-
sional election resulted in a Senate evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. Because
Republican Dick Cheney was elected vice-president in the 2000 presidential election, initially Re-
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publicans were considered the majority party, with senator Trent Lott receiving “the right of first
recognition” and committee chairmanships being assigned to Republican senators1. However, on
May 24, 2001, Republican senator James M. Jeffords announced that he would leave his party
to become an Independent and would caucus with the Democratic Party, putting them in control
of the Senate. This had deep organizational consequences including a transfer in agenda-setting
powers to the Democrat leader Tom Daschle and a change in all committee chairmanships.
Clinton et al. (2004) analyzed the roll-call votes from the 107th U.S. Senate by fitting separate
one-dimensional spatial voting models for motions before and after Jeffords’ defection and con-
structing posterior credible intervals for difference in ideal points as well as for the difference in
their rank-order. This analysis identified a number senators (including Democratic and Republican
leaders Daschle and Lott, as well party switcher Jeffords and senators Gregg, Torricelli, Thomp-
son, Shelby, McConnell, Ensign and Hutchinson) whose preferences seemed to be affected by the
change in majority status. On a follow-up analysis, Roberts (2007) investigate the apparent change
in preferences of the two party leaders (see Figure 1) in terms of their behavior on cloture mo-
tions. In particular, Roberts (2007) argues that majority leaders might appear less partisan simply
because they sometimes vote strategically against their party during cloture motions so it can be
later reconsidered if it fails to receive a qualified majority2.
Although the conclusions from both of these analyses are certainly plausible and match pre-
vious theoretical and empirical work, the methodology used to reach them is unsatisfactory. One
reason is that comparing the rank order of legislators before and after the change in leadership ig-
nores that the ranks of different legislators are not independent. Indeed, for a legislator to increase
her rank, other(s) need to decrease their own. The obvious alternative is to base the comparisons
on the actual ideal points rather than the rank order induced by them. However, comparing the
ideal points directly is difficult because of the invariance of the policy space to affine transforma-
tions, and the fact that we have no data linking both policy spaces. These features imply imply
that estimates obtained by fitting separate models to each collection of motions are not directly
comparable, as they do not necessarily share a common ideological scale. Clinton et al. (2004)
1In spite of Republicans being considered the majority party, Democrats were able to extract some concessions
in these unusual circumstances. For example, committee assignments, staff and other resources were divided equally
among the two parties instead of the more usual arrangement in which the majority party receives a bigger share of
resources.
2Senate Rule XIII states that “When a question has been decided by the Senate, any senator voting with the prevail-
ing side ... may, on the same day or on either of the next two days of actual session thereafter, move a reconsideration
... .”
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SHELBY (R AL)
MCCAIN (R AZ)
MILLER (D GA)
LOTT (R MS)
BAUCUS (D MT)
ENSIGN (R NV)
GREGG (R NH)
TORRICELLI (D NJ)
SMITH (R OR)
DASCHLE (D SD)
JEFFORDS (R VT)
Figure 1: Comparison of the ideal point ranks of legislators in the 107th US Senate obtained
by fitting independent one-dimensional Bayesian spatial voting models (Jackman, 2001) to the
motions voted on before and after the defection of senator James M. Jeffords from the Republican
party. Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+),
and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle (4).
attempt to address this issue by standardizing each set of ideal point estimates to have mean zero
and variance. However, this type of ad-hoc adjustment a posteriori does not really ensure that votes
on motions are scaled on a common latent dimension. A second reason for potential concern with
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the approaches currently used to assess the stability of legislator’s preferences is the lack of adjust-
ment for multiplicities. Identifying changes in preferences in the U.S. Senate implies testing 100
different hypotheses about the relative positions of ideal points, which requires that we adjust our
procedures to avoid a large number of false positives. Although orrections based on Bonferroni
(e.g., see Abdi, 2007) or False Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) procedures are
possible solutions to this type of multiplicity issue, but in our experience they have been rarely
used. The challenge of comparing individuals traits associated with different latent scales also
arises in educational testing, e.g., when attempting to compare the skill level inferred using item
response theory (IRT) models (Fox, 2010) for participants in two or more multiple choice tests.
In this paper we consider a joint model for two groups of motions that allows us to explicitly test
sharp hypotheses about differences in legislators’ revealed preferences. Our model is an extension
of the Bayesian spatial voting models discussed in Jackman (2001) and Clinton et al. (2004) that
incorporates hierarchical zero-inflated priors that link the ideal points for the different groups of
measures. Indeed, instead of ad-hoc adjustments to the posterior distribution such as the one
proposed in Clinton et al. (2004), our model induces a common scale across both policy spaces
by assuming that not all legislators change their preferences, so that legislators whose preferences
remain unchanged serve as a bridge between the two policy spaces (Shor et al., 2010; Shor and
McCarty, 2011).
Although our model is built in a similar spirit, our approach differs from that in Martin and
Quinn (2002). Indeed, we are interested in testing sharp hypotheses about changes in revealed
preferences rather than model their smooth evolution over longer periods. Our approach is an al-
ternative to frequentist approaches based on the bootstrap (e.g., see Lewis and Poole, 2004 and
Carroll et al., 2009) and shares the advantages (and disadvantages) of Bayesian approaches to vari-
able selection based on Bayes factors/posterior probabilities. In particular, our simulation studies
suggest that our model automatically addresses issues of multiple comparisons, an observation that
is consistent with Scott and Berger (2006) and Scott and Berger (2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of our
statistical model. Section 3 discusses hyperparameter elicitation and some general remarks on
our computational implementation of the model. Section 4 presents our analysis of the data from
the 107th U.S. Senate, as well as a number of sensitivity and simulation studies that explore the
properties of our model in this application. Finally, Section 5 presents a short discussion and future
research directions.
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2 Model description
2.1 Bayesian spatial voting models
Let yi,j ∈ {0, 1} encode the vote cast by legislator i = 1, . . . , I on motion j = 1, . . . , J , with
yi,j = 1 if the vote corresponds to a “Yea” and yi,j = 0 if it corresponds to a “Nay”. The spatial
voting model of Jackman (2001) and Clinton et al. (2004) assumes that legislators make decisions
according random quadratic utility functions
U0 (βi, zj,0) = −‖βi − zj,0‖2 + j,0, U1 (βi, zj,1) = −‖βi − zj,1‖2 + j,1,
where U0 and U1 are, respectively, the utilities associated with a negative and a positive vote,
βi = (βi,0,1, . . . , βi,0,K)
T corresponds to the position of legislator i in a K dimensional Euclidean
policy space (his or her “ideal point”), zj,0 and zj,1 are, respectively, the positions associated with
a negative and a positive vote on motion j in the same policy space, and j,0 and j,1 are random
shocks. These assumptions lead to a likelihood of the form
yi,j | µj,αj,βi ∼ Bernoulli
(
yi,j
∣∣G (µj + αTj βi)) , (1)
where µj = zTj,0zj,0 − zTj,1zj,1 controls the baseline probability of a positive vote in motion j,
αj = (αj,1, . . . , αj,K)
T = 2 (zj,1 − zj,0) controls the effect of the ideal points of the legislators on
the probability of a positive vote in motion j and G is an appropriate link function. For example,
if j,0 − j,1 follows a standard normal distribution then G corresponds to the probit link, so that
G
(
µj + α
T
j βi
)
= Φ
(
µj + α
T
j βi
)
,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution, while if j,0−j,1 follows
a standard logistic distribution then
G
(
µj + α
T
j βi
)
=
exp
{
µj + α
T
j βi
}
1 + exp
{
µj + αTj βi
} .
In Section 4 we consider both types of links and study the sensitivity of the results to this choice.
The model is completed by specifying prior distributions for the model parameters. It is com-
mon to assume that the intercepts µ1, . . . , µJ are independent and identically distributed from a
normal distribution with unknown mean ρµ and variance κ2µ, i.e., µj | ρµ, κ2µ ∼ N
(
µj | ρµ, κ2µ
)
.
The hyperparameters ρµ and κ2µ are in turn assigned independent Gaussian and Inverse-Gamma
priors. Similarly, we use conditionally independent zero-inflated Gaussian priors,
αj,k | ωα,k, κ2α ∼ ωα,kδ0 (αj,k) + (1− ωα,k)N
(
αj,k | 0, κ2α
)
,
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where δ0(·) denotes the degenerate measure placing probability one at zero (for example, see Hahn
et al., 2012), κ2α is given an Inverse-Gamma hyperprior, and ωα,k is given a beta prior. The use of
zero-inflated priors for the components of αj allows us to explicitly test the significance of specific
dimensions of the policy space. In particular, note that if αj,k = 0 for all j then the k-th component
of the policy space has no effect on the voting probability and the effective dimension of the policy
space is no larger than K − 1. In our specification, ωα,k is the prior probability that the k-th
dimension of the policy space does not affect the voting behavior of the legislators in motion j; for
example, the prior probability that dimension k is irrelevant is simply ωJα,k. Finally, it is common
to assume that the ideal points are independently distributed with βi | η,Σ ∼ N (βi | η,Σ).
One challenge associated with the interpretation of spatial voting models is the invariance of
the policy space to translations, rotations, reflexions and rescaling. A common approach to enforce
identifiability in these models is to impose constraints on the mean and variance of the ideal points
so that η = 0 and Σ = I (which removes issues related to location and scale) along with constraints
on the vectors α1, . . . ,αK so that αj,j > 0 (which takes care of reflections) and αj,k = 0 if k > j
(which addresses invariance to rotations). In this paper we follow the alternative approach of
fixing the position of K + 1 legislators in policy space (Rivers, 2003; Clinton et al., 2004). We
carefully choose the legislators whose ideal points are constrained to facilitate the interpretation of
the model. For example, when modeling the U.S. Senate using a unidimensional policy space, we
ensure identifiability of the parameters by setting the ideal point of two legislators that are clearly
in opposite extremes of the political spectrum to +1 and −1 respectively. Examples include the
leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties, the whips of each party, or the two senators
perceived to be the most extreme. The results are invariant to the identity of the legislators, as long
as they are reasonably well separated and on opposite sides. This choice enables us to interpret the
policy space in terms of a liberal-conservative ideology, at least to the extent in which parties are
ideologically opposites.
2.2 Assessing differences in ideal points
We consider now a joint model for two groups of motions, identified through (known) indicator
variables γ1, . . . , γJ such that γj ∈ {0, 1}. As discussed in the introduction, the goal of this model
is to test whether each legislator’s voting behavior expresses different revealed preferences in each
of these sets of motions. In our illustration, these two groups of motions correspond to those passed
during the periods when either the Republicans or Democrats controlled the 107th Senate, so that
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γj = 0 if the j-th motion was voted upon before senator Jeffords’ defection from the Republican
party and γj = 1 otherwise. In this setting it is natural to extend (1) so that
yi,j | γj, µj,αj,βi,0,βi,1 ∼ Bernoulli
(
yi,j
∣∣∣G(µj + αTj βi,γj)) , (2)
where βi,0 = (βi,0,1, . . . , βi,0,K)T and βi,1 = (βi,0,1, . . . , βi,0,K)T correspond to the (potentially
distinct) ideal points of legislator i on each of the two groups of motions.
The likelihood (2) allows (in principle) for different ideal points for each of the two groups of
motions. If we were to assign independent priors to βi,0 and βi,1, fitting this joint model would be
equivalent to fitting separate (independent) models to each of the two groups. Instead, we propose
a mixture prior that incorporates the possibility that the ideal points are the same,
βi,0,βi,1 | ζi,η,Σ ∼
N
(
βi,0 | η,Σ
)
δβi,0
(
βi,1
)
ζi = 1
N
(
βi,0 | η,Σ
)
N
(
βi,1 | η,Σ
)
ζi = 0,
(3)
The (unknown) auxiliary variables ζ1, . . . , ζI indicate whether the legislators express the same
revealed preferences on both groups of motions or not. In particular, ζi = 1 implies that βi,0 = βi,1
(so that the i-th legislator is a bridge), whereas ζi = 0 implies that βi,0 6= βi,1. Hence, if ζi = 1 for
all i then our approach is equivalent to fitting a single spatial voting model to all motions. On the
other hand, if ζi = 0 for all i then our model fits conditionally independent ideal points for each
legislator and group of motions. Hence, these latent indicators are the key parameters of interest
in our analysis.
Because there is no overlap between the measures being voted upon on each period, identifi-
cation of model requires that 2(K + 1) constraints be introduced, K + 1 associated with the set
of ideal points β1,0, . . . ,βI,0, and another K + 1 associated with β1,1, . . . ,βI,1. While previous
authors have imposed independent sets of constraints on each of these two sets of ideal points, we
proceed by fixing the position of K+ 1 ideal points and requiring at leastK+ 1 bridge legislators,
whose ideal points remain fixed. The idea of using legislators whose preferences do not change
over time and get to vote on different groups of motions has been exploited by Shor et al. (2010)
and Shor and McCarty (2011) to compare ideological biases between state legislatures and the U.S.
Congress. However, their approach relies on fixing the identity of bridge legislators beforehand,
while the key feature of our model is that we aim at identifying the bridges as part of our analysis.
In order to make inferences on the identity of the bridge legislators while simultaneously en-
forcing the presence of at least K + 1 bridges we define a joint prior on the indicators ζ1, . . . , ζI of
8
the form,
p(ζ1, . . . , ζI) =
Γ
(
a+
∑I
i=1 ζi
)
Γ
(
b+ I −∑Ii=1 ζi)
1−∑Ks′=0 ( Is′)Γ (a+ s′) Γ (b+ I − s′) ,
I∑
i=1
ζi = K + 1, . . . , I,
where a and b are hyperparameters. To justify this prior, note that it can be rewritten as
p(ζ1, . . . , ζI) = p
(
ζ1, . . . , ζI |
I∑
i=1
ζi = s
)
p
(
I∑
i=1
ζi = s
)
where p
(
ζ1, . . . , ζI |
∑I
i=1 ζi = s
)
=
(
I
s
)−1
is uniform on all possible subsets of s bridge legisla-
tors and
p
(
I∑
i=1
ζi = s
)
=
(
I
s
)
Γ (a+ s) Γ (b+ I − s)
1−∑Ks′=0 ( Is′)Γ (a+ s′) Γ (b+ I − s′) , s = K + 1, . . . , I,
corresponds to a truncated Beta-Binomial prior on the number of bridges. This last prior on the
number of bridge legislators can be motivated by noting that the non-truncated version corresponds
to the marginal distribution of a hierarchical model where
∑I
i=1 ζi | λ ∼ Bin(I, λ) and λ ∼
Beta(a, b) (which is the model suggested in Scott and Berger, 2006 and Scott and Berger, 2010 to
address multiplicity issues). We introduce the truncation to ensure the minimum number of bridges
required for the model to be identifiable.
The hyperparameters a and b control the prior mean and variance on the number of bridge
legislators. In particular, setting a = 1 and b = 1 leads to a uniform distribution distribution on the
number of bridges, so that
p(ζ1, . . . , ζI | a = 1, b = 1) =
(
I∑I
i=1 ζi
)
1
I −K ,
I∑
i=1
ζi = K + 1, . . . , I.
Large values of a/b lead to a large expected number of bridges a priori, while large values of a+ b
lead to lower prior variance.
Finally, as in the previous Section, we assume µj | ρµ, κ2µ ∼ N
(
ρµ, κ
2
µ
)
independently for all j,
use conditionally independent zero-inflated Gaussian priors, αj,k | ωα,k, κ2α ∼ ωα,kδ0 (αj,k) +
(1 − ωα,k)N (αj,k | 0, κ2α), and assign hyperpriors to the unknown parameters ρµ, κ2µ, κ2α and
ωα,1, . . . , ωα,K .
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2.3 Alternative prior specifications
Alternative specifications for the joint prior p(βi,0,βi,1 | ζi) are possible. For example, one of the
referees suggested setting βi,1 = βi,0 + ∆i where βi,0 | η,Σ ∼ N(βi,0 | η,Σ) and
∆i | ζi ∼
δ0(∆i) ζi = 1N(∆i | 0,Ω) ζi = 0,
which is in spirit of Clinton et al. (2004). Note that this specification implies(
βi,0
βi,1
)
| ζi = 0 ∼ N
((η
η
)
,
(
Σ Σ
Σ Σ + Ω
))
, (4)
as opposed to that by implied by (3),(
βi,0
βi,1
)
| ζi = 0 ∼ N
((η
η
)
,
(
Σ 0
0 Σ
))
. (5)
The main differences between these two priors are 1) the marginal variances of β0,i and β1,i
are different from each other in (4) (and in particular, β1,i is forced to have a higher variance than
β0,i), and 2) a priori, there is a non-zero correlation between both ideal points in (4). For us, the
first feature is particularly problematic. It is not clear to us why we should assume a priori that one
set of ideal points has a higher variance than the other, specially if our working assumption is that
both sets of ideal points live in the same policy space. Furthermore, although in the illustration we
discuss in Section 4 there is a natural ordering to the two groups of measures (it would seem natural
to center the ideal points after the switch around the ideal points before), that is not the case in other
interesting applications. Hence, our preference for the exchangeable model (5), which treats both
groups of measures identically. About the second feature of the proposed prior, we note that (5)
could be easily extended to include (positive) correlations between both groups of measures when
ζi = 0. However, including correlations can lead to identifiability issues: in the limit (when the
value of the correlations approach one) the conditional prior on ζi = 0 becomes identical to the
prior conditional on ζi = 1. Hence, working with a model that assumes no correlation not only
simplifies elicitation, but it can be considered as the most favorable prior to differences (within the
class we consider).
3 Hyperpriors and Computation
We discuss now the specification of priors for the unknown hyperparameters in our model. For
the hyperprior on the intercepts µ1, . . . , µJ we let ρµ ∼ N(ρµ | 0, 1) and κ2µ ∼ IGam(κ2µ | 2, 1),
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where IGam denotes the inverse Gamma distribution (in this case, with mean 1). Note that this
choice implies that, marginally, E {µj} = 0 and Var {µj} = 1, so that if αj = 0, then Pr (yi,j)
has, a priori, a mean of 0 and approximately 95% probability of falling in the interval (0.06, 0.94),
i.e., we do not favor a priori very extreme values for this probability. Using a similar argument
we set the prior on the variance of the parameters αj,k as κ2α ∼ IGam(2, 1) and the priors for the
mean and variance of the random effects as η ∼ N(η | 0, I) and Σ ∼ IWis (Σ | K + 1, I), where
IWis denotes the inverse Wishart distribution (in this case, with mean I). Centering the hyperprior
for η around 0 and the hyperprior for Σ around I is natural given that the way we defined the
identifiability constraints. For the prior probability that a positive vote on the j-th motion depends
on the k-th dimension of the policy space we have ωα,k ∼ Beta (υ/K, 1) which implies that, for
a large value of K, the probability of a positive vote on any given motion depends a priori on
υK/{K + υ} ≈ υ dimensions of the policy space. Finally, we set a = 1 and b = 9. For the
U.S. Senate, this choice implies that we expect an average of 11.8 senators that exhibit different
preferences on each group of motion.
Posterior inferences on the model parameters are obtained using Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithms (Robert and Casella, 2005). Given initial values for the parameters, these
algorithms successively updates parameters by sampling from their full conditional distributions.
After an appropriate burn-in period, the simulated values are an approximate representation of the
target posterior distribution. In the case of a probit link, sampling can be simplified by introducing
auxiliary Gaussian random variables as described by Albert and Chib (1993). In the case of a logit
link we implement a sampler based on Po´lya-Gamma auxiliary random variables along the lines
described in Polson et al. (2013).
Identifiability is enforced through a parameter expansion approach (Liu et al., 1998; Ghosh
and Dunson, 2009). At each iteration of the MCMC, the parameters µj,αj,βi,γj are first sampled
without any constraint and then the parameters are transformed by applying an appropriate affine
transformation. Details of the computational algorithm are presented in the on-line supplement.
4 Changes in revealed preferences in the 107th U.S. Senate
In this Section we analyze the voting record of the 107th U.S. Senate introduced in Section 1. Re-
call that in this example our two groups of motions correspond to those voted on under Republican
(166 motions voted on before May 24, 2001) and Democratic (467 motions voted on after May
24, 2001) control of the Senate. We assume that abstentions (i.e., missing values) are ignorable. In
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that regard, we note that only 2.58% of the votes are missing (so abstentions are relatively rare),
and tend to be concentrated in a small number of senators and motions. Furthermore, our previ-
ous work on the use of abstentions in the U.S. Congress suggests that strategic behavior is also
relatively rare (Rodrı´guez and Moser, 2015). We also note that senator Paul Wellstone (Democrat,
MN) died in a plane crash October 25, 2002, and was replaced by senator Dean Barkley. Hence,
we follow Roberts (2007) and exclude senator’s Barkley (who voted in only 14 roll calls) from the
analyses. All results presented below are based on 50,000 iterations of our Markov chain Monte
Carlo algorithms, and we monitored convergence using the multi-chain algorithm described in Gel-
man and Rubin (1992). To facilitate comparisons with previous analyses of this dataset we fit a one
dimensional model (K = 1) to the data. We do not consider this last assumption a limitation, as
the U.S. Senate is widely acknowledged to be unidimensional (Poole and Rosenthal, 1987, 1991,
1997; McCarty et al., 2006).
We first present an analysis based on our joint model with a probit link. We focus on this model
first because the probit link was used in previous analyses of the data by Clinton et al. (2004) and
Roberts (2007). Figure 2 presents the 40 senators our model identify as having the largest posterior
probabilities of a change in preferences. There is evidence of changes in revealed preferences for
14 senators, which could be roughly grouped into three clusters: a group of seven senators (Torri-
celli, Daschle, Jeffords, McCain, Miller, Baucus and Gregg) with probabilities above 0.99 (which,
following Kass and Raftery, 1995, we consider very strong evidence of a change in revealed pref-
erences), a second group of five senators (Enzi, Shelby, Smith(NH), Lott, Cochran) with posterior
probabilities between 0.8 and 0.9 (which, again following Kass and Raftery, 1995, we consider
strong evidence of a change), and a final cluster of two senators (Smith (OR) and Ensign) with
probabilities between 0.65 and 0.75 (showing weak evidence). In addition to the posterior prob-
abilities, we show in Figure 3 symmetric 95% posterior intervals for the effect of the leadership
change on the ideal points of the fourteen senators identified above as presenting changes in re-
vealed preferences (constructed conditionally on the differences being present), and in Figure 4
the posterior mean of the ideal points (panel (a)) and the posterior mean ranks (panel (b)) for all
100 senators both before and after Jeffords’ switch. From Figure 3, note that the majority of the 14
senators identified as changing their preferences appear to move towards the left; the exceptions
are four Republicans (Lott, McCain, Cochran and Ensign) and democratic leader Daschle. It is
also worthwhile noting that the uncertainty associated with senators McCain, Miller and Baucus
(who, as we just discussed, are not identified in Clinton et al. (2004) as changing their preferences)
is relatively low. From Figure 4, note that the difference in ideal points for some of the Senators
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Figure 2: Senators with the 40 largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points under
our joint unidimensional model with a probit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles
(◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green
triangle (4). There is at least weak evidence of a change in revealed preferences for 15 legislators,
including party leaders Daschle and Lott.
can be large even if the ranks remain almost unchanged (as is the case with McCain), and vice
versa (as is the case with Daschle). We also note that both the ideal points and the ranks fall very
close to the diagonal line, suggesting that our joint model generates much more stable estimates of
legislators preferences (at least, when compared with those in Figure 1).
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The fact that senator Jeffords’ preferences appear to move leftward is intuitively reasonable
and consistent with previous work by Nokken (2000) and Nokken and Poole (2004). It supports
the theory that changes in party membership of sitting legislators are associated with changes in
revealed preferences. The results are also in line with the analysis in Roberts (2007), who argues
that the party leaders should exhibit a change in preferences and (in this case) appear more right-
leaning after the Democrats become the majority party. On the other hand, our results are only
partially consistent with those presented in Clinton et al. (2004). Indeed, although Clinton et al.
(2004) reported senators Jeffords, Daschle, Lott, Gregg, Smith (NH) and Torricelli as being among
the ten legislators with the largest changes in preferences, there are also some striking differences
between the two sets of results. Firstly, senators Kyl, Wellstone and Gramm are identified in
Clinton et al. (2004) as exhibiting a large change in preferences. However, our model finds no such
evidence; in particular, Wellstone and Gramm do not even make in the list of of the 40 senators
with the largest probabilities of a change in preferences. Secondly, three of the senators for which
we find evidence of a change in preferences (McCain, Miller, Baucus) are not included in either of
Clinton et al. (2004) two top-ten lists for changes in preferences. It is particularly noteworthy that
these last three senators are all centrists, while all the ones identified by Clinton et al. (2004) but
not by our model (Kyl, Wellstone and Gramm) are at the extremes of their respective parties. The
results are also mostly inconsistent with the theory that minority parties tend to stake more extreme
positions than their real preferences would indicate (May, 1973; Clausen and Wilcox, 1987; Merrill
et al., 1999). Indeed, in the context of our illustration, this would suggest that both Republicans
and Democrats should tend to become more conservative after Jeffords’ switch (roughly speaking,
Republicans would benefit from staking a more rightward position once they become a minority,
while the Democrats lose their incentive to stake a more leftwing position than their preferred
one). However, although this appears to be true for the party leaders (which in their case can be
explained by the effect of procedural votes), overall our results provide limited evidence for this
phenomenon.
The previous analysis showed that the revealed preferences displayed by senators were affected
by Jefford’s switch, but our analysis focused on changes of individual legislators rather than on a
summary of the effect of the chamber as a whole. To address this, Figure 5 presents Gaussian kernel
density estimates associated with the posterior means of the ideal points before and after Jeffords’
switch. These kernel density estimates can be interpreted in terms of polarization, a topic that has
been widely covered in the political science literature. Indeed, the relative spread of (intra-party or
chamber) estimates is a common way of measuring polarization in political science (e.g., see Poole
14
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Figure 3: Estimated differences in ideal points (after the switch minus before) and 95% posterior
interval bands for the senators with the largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points
under our joint unidimensional model with a probit link. These intervals were constructed con-
ditionally on the a difference being present, i.e., conditional on ζi = 0. Names in red, blue and
green correspond to Republican, Democrat and independent senators. About half of the legislators
on each party appear to become more conservative, while the other half appear to become more
liberal.
and Rosenthal, 1984 and McCarty et al., 2006). Since in this case both sets of ideal points share a
common scale, we can extend that analysis to the spread and shape of these two distributions. In
particular, we note that the two humps that can be observed in each density estimate correspond
to the two parties represented in the US Congress. Hence, although both graphs are very similar,
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Figure 4: Comparison of the posterior mean of the ideal points (left panel) and the rank order of
senators (right panel) before and after the switch in Senate control under our joint unidimensional
model with a probit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦), Republicans appear as red
plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle (4). Note that the estimates
of the change of the order rank of legislators under our joint model are much more conservative
than those shown in Figure 1.
it appears as if the parties became somewhat more ideologically homogeneous in terms of their
preferences after Jeffords’ switch (note that the modes become more pronounced). There also
seems to be a slight tendency of extreme Republicans to become less extreme (as the right tail of
the density seems slightly shorter).
4.1 Sensitivity analysis
To assess the robustness of our analysis to the choice of link functions we reanalyzed the data using
a logit link. As before, Figure 6 shows the 40 legislators with the largest posterior probability of a
different estimated ideal point. The conclusions derived from this graph are very similar to those
derived from Figure 2. However, under a logit link the evidence of a change in revealed preferences
for senators Lott and Smith (NH) disappears. We believe that, at least in Republican leader Lott’s
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Figure 5: Estimated posterior mean ideal points densities for before and after the majority party
switch. The solid line ( ) is based on the estimates after Jeffords’ switch, while the dashed
line ( ) is based on the estimates before Jeffords’ switch. Note that the two modes seem to
become more pronounced (i.e., the parties become more polarized) after senator Jeffords’ switch.
case, this difference is driven by the fact that assigning a logistic distribution to utility shocks tends
to downweight the influence of outliers in the estimates of the ideal points that arise because of
procedural rules. Indeed, recall from Section 1 that U.S. Senate rules create incentives for the
majority leader to vote against his/her party in certain cloture motions. These motions are rare, but
their influence can make majority leaders appear to be more centrist than they really are Roberts
(2007). What is interesting, though, is that although the conclusion for Republican leader Lott
17
is affected by the link function, the conclusion for Democratic leader Daschle is not. This is in
partial contradiction to the conclusions of Roberts (2007) (which are based on comparing ranks of
legislators generated by individual probit models), who argues that removing these outlier votes
from the analysis eliminates the differences in revealed preferences.
Pr
(ζ i=
0|D
ata
)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
TO
RR
IC
EL
LI
 (D
 N
J)
JE
FF
O
RD
S 
(R
 V
T)
M
CC
AI
N 
(R
 A
Z)
DA
SC
HL
E 
(D
 S
D)
M
IL
LE
R
 (D
 G
A)
BA
UC
US
 (D
 M
T)
G
RE
G
G
 (R
 N
H)
SH
EL
BY
 (R
 A
L)
EN
ZI
 (R
 W
Y)
EN
SI
G
N 
(R
 N
V)
CO
CH
RA
N 
(R
 M
S)
SM
IT
H 
(R
 O
R)
LO
TT
 (R
 M
S)
SM
IT
H 
(R
 N
H)
G
RA
HA
M
 (D
 FL
)
TH
O
M
PS
O
N 
(R
 TN
)
CA
NT
W
EL
L 
(D
 W
A)
H
UT
CH
IN
SO
N 
(R
 A
R)
TH
UR
M
O
ND
 (R
 S
C)
BR
OW
N
BA
CK
 (R
 K
S)
BR
EA
UX
 (D
 LA
)
N
EL
SO
N 
(D
 N
E)
CL
EL
AN
D 
(D
 G
A)
BO
ND
 (R
 M
O)
R
EE
D
 (D
 R
I)
LU
G
AR
 (R
 IN
)
H
UT
CH
IS
O
N 
(R
 TX
)
IN
O
UY
E 
(D
 H
I)
KY
L 
(R
 A
Z)
LI
EB
ER
M
AN
 (D
 C
T)
W
YD
EN
 (D
 O
R)
ST
AB
EN
OW
 (D
 M
I)
N
EL
SO
N 
(D
 FL
)
M
CC
O
NN
EL
L 
(R
 K
Y)
CL
IN
TO
N 
(D
 N
Y)
H
O
LL
IN
G
S 
(D
 S
C)
IN
H
O
FE
 (R
 O
K)
VO
IN
OV
IC
H 
(R
 O
H)
LA
N
D
R
IE
U 
(D
 LA
)
LI
N
CO
LN
 (D
 A
R)
l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l
Figure 6: Senators with the 40 largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points under
our joint unidimensional model with a logit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦),
Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle
(4). In this case there is at least weak evidence of a change in revealed preferences for only 12
legislators (note that Republican leader Lott is not among them).
We also investigated the robustness of the results to the prior on the number of bridge legisla-
18
After Jeffords' switch
Be
fo
re
 J
ef
fo
rd
s' 
sw
itc
h
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
41
43
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
59
61
63
65
67
69
71
73
75
77
79
81
83
85
87
89
91
93
95
97
99
l
lll
l
l
ll
ll
lll
l l
l
ll
l
lll
lll
ll
l
ll
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l ll
l ll
l
SHELBY (R AL)
MCCAIN (R AZ)
MILLER (D GA)
LOTT (R MS)
BAUCUS (D MT)
ENSIGN (R NV)
GREGG (R NH)
TORRICELLI (D NJ)
SMITH (R OR)
DASCHLE (D SD)
JEFFORDS (R VT)
Figure 7: Posterior mean of the rank order of senators before and after the switch in Senate control
under our joint unidimensional model with a logit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles
(◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green
triangle (4). These estimates are very similar to those shown in Figure 4.
tors. In addition to our original prior with a = 1 and b = 9, we fitted the model using a truncated
negative binomial prior with parameters a = 1 and b = 1 (which, as we discussed before, implies
a uniform prior on the number of bridge legislators). Figure 8 presents the equivalent of Figure 2
under this prior; note that the conclusions are essentially identical to those obtained under as our
original prior. Similar results were observed when a prior with a = 0.1 and b = 0.9 was used (plot
not shown).
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Figure 8: Senators with the 40 largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points under
our joint unidimensional model with a probit link under the alternate prior a = 1 and b = 1.
Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and
party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle (4).
Another aspect of our sensitivity analysis was an investigation of the robustness of our results
to our choice of identifiability constraints. Recall that we enforced identifiability by fixing the ideal
points of the two party leaders (senators Trent Lott and Tom Daschle) to 1 and −1 respectively.
Since a good part of our analysis focuses on these two legislators, we also fitted the model by fixing
instead the party whips rather than leaders (which in the 107th Senate corresponds to Republican
Don Nickles and Democrat Harry Reid) as well as by fixing the two most “extreme” legislators (in
20
this case, Republican Hems and Democrat Wellstone). As expected, we saw no difference in the
results (plot not shown).
Finally, we investigated the impact of the priors on η and Σ. In addition to the original N(η |
0, 1) and IGam(σ2 | 2, 1) priors, we also tried overdispersed N(η | 0, 25) and IGam(σ2 | 2, 25)
priors. The results did not change under these priors (plot not shown).
4.2 Simulation study and error rates
In the introduction we argued that one of the advantages of our Bayesian model includes its ability
to automatically adjust for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, we argued that comparisons based
on comparing the ideological ranks of the legislators are bound to be less accurate than those based
on our model. To provide some empirical support for this claim we performed a simulation study
in which data for 100 legislators and 633 motions (the same numbers as in the 107th Senate) were
simulated according to a couple of different scenarios.
In our first scenario we generated 10 datasets from a logistic unidimensional voting model in
which we assumed the same ideal points before and after the majority party switch for all legisla-
tors. We use as true values for the parameters the posterior means obtained by fitting a standard
spatial logistic voting model to the full set of roll-call votes from the 107th Senate. This scenario is
used to inquire on the occurrence of false positives, i.e., detecting a difference in ideal points when
in truth there is none. In particular, we study the individual and familywise error rate associated
with our testing procedure. Figure 9 shows the proportion of simulations in which we identified
at least one false positive result (which corresponds to an estimate of the familywise false positive
rate) as well as the mean proportion of false positives identified (which provides an estimate of
the individual false positive rate on each test) for different posterior probability thresholds. As ex-
pected, the familywise error rate is slightly above the individual error rate. However, note that for
thresholds above 0.5 (which are the most likely to be used in practice) both values are essentially
zero.
In our second scenario we generated 10 more datasets from a logistic unidimensional voting
model in which we assume that the 12 senators we identified in Figure 6 are the only ones that
exhibit different preferences. More concretely, the values of the true parameters used to generate
these datasets correspond to the posterior means obtained by fitting our joint logit model the data
from the 107th Senate assuming that ζi = 0 for all senators except Torricelli, Jeffords, McCain,
Daschle, Miller, Baucus, Gregg, Shelby, Enzi, Smith (OR), Cochran and Ensign. In addition to
21
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Figure 9: Mean proportion of false positives (black solid line, ) and proportion of simulations
with at least one false positive (red dashed line, ) for different posterior probability thresholds
in our first simulation study. A false positive rate of 0.05 is shown in grey. Note that for thresholds
above 0.5 both of these error rates are below 1%.
fitting our hierarchical model, we also fit standard logistic models to the roll-calls before and af-
ter Jeffords’ switch, and compute credible intervals for the difference in rank order in ideological
space. This simulation has two goals. The first one is to assess both the false positive (detecting
a difference in ideal point when in truth there is none) and false negative (failing to detect a dif-
ference) rates associated with our procedure. The second is to evaluate the performance of our
hierarchical model against a commonly used methodology. Figure 10 shows the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve associated with each of the two methods. The curves show that our
22
procedure is highly accurate in detecting true differences whose size is similar to the ones we iden-
tified in our analysis of the 107th Senate, and that it outperforms the methodology most commonly
used in this context. In particular, note that the area under the curve (AUC) for the average ROCs
curves are 0.98 and 0.86 respectively.
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Figure 10: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for our second simulation study. Panel
(a) presents the ROC curves constructed from our method that uses posterior probabilities, while
panel (b) shows the ROC curves constructed from the methods used in Clinton et al. (2004) and
Roberts (2007). We show both the individual ROC curves associated with each of our simulated
datasets (grey dashed lines, ), as well as the average ROC curve (black solid line, ).
The area under the curve (AUC) for the average ROCs curves are 0.98 and 0.86 respectively.
5 Discussion
We have presented a statistical model that allows for testing of sharp hypotheses associated with
the stability of legislator’s preferences inferred from roll call data that fills a methodological short-
coming in the literature on the analysis of roll-call data. In particular, our model focuses in the
use of zero-inflated priors with carefully constructed hyperpriors that allow us to identify bridge
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legislators that connect the arbitrary ideological scales associated with different groups of motions
and make them comparable.
In addition to our methodological contribution, we also present a detailed analysis of the vot-
ing record of the 107th U.S. Senate, which saw a major reorganization (which included a switch in
agenda-setting powers from the Republican to the Democratic party) in the middle of the session
due to a change in party affiliation of senator James M. Jeffords. Because the time period under
consideration is relative short and Jeffords’ switch is as close as to a surprise shock as we are likely
to see, we have interpreted the observed changes in revealed preferences as being causally related
to the switch. In particular, we have argued that our analysis provides empirical evidence for the
effect of party membership on revealed preferences (we find strong evidence that senator Jeffords’
preferences appear to be different after he leaves the Republican party), but no evidence for the
effect of majority status on legislators preferences (as most legislators who had their preferences
affected by the reorganization tend to become liberal rather than conservative). However, we em-
phasize that, as with other analyses, care needs to be excersized when making causal attributions
for the differences identified by our model.
Our analysis of the 107th U.S. Senate also highlights the pitfalls associated with assessing
the stability of legislators’ revealed preferences using ad-hoc adjustments to the latent ideological
scales (as in Clinton et al., 2004) or by focusing on the rank order of legislators in the ideological
space (as in Roberts, 2007). It also highlights the potential impact of different link functions on the
analysis. Indeed, although both the probit and logit links tend to provide similar results, the fact
that the results of the analysis for Republican leader Trent Lott are affected by the choice of link
function combined with our knowledge that procedural rules provide specific incentives for party
leaders to deviate from their preferred behavior, suggest that analyses of the stability of preferences
should be conducted using links such as the logit, allowing the model to be more robust to outliers.
Finally, we note that two interesting extensions of our model involve comparing more than two
groups of motions (e.g. comparing types of motions such as procedural, amendment, final passage,
etc., see for example Jessee and Theriault, 2014) and incorporating point mass priors on dynamic
models such as those in Martin and Quinn (2002). These extensions will be pursued elsewhere.
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